Sebastian Leguizamon

 SebastianJ. Leguizamon

Sebastian J. Leguizamon

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May 21, 2020
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I liked this professor because he was a good lecturer who has the best pacing in class. Exams account for 84 percent of the class, but you are only scored on the best three exams out of four. The only disappointment I had was that it seemed that I was wasting a lot of time doing arithmetic that a computer program could perform really quickly.

Biography

Western Kentucky University - Economics


Resume

  • 2006

    Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

    Economics

    West Virginia University

    High School Diploma

    Colegio San Carlos

  • 2001

    Spanish

    English

    Bachelor of Applied Science (B.A.Sc.)

    Economics and Management Information Systems

    Davis and Elkins College

  • Spanish

    PowerPoint

    Qualitative Research

    SAS

    LaTeX

    Economics

    Higher Education

    Public Speaking

    Research

    Stata

    University Teaching

    C++

    Econometrics

    Teaching

    Microsoft Word

    Statistics

    Data Analysis

    Matlab

    Term Limits

    Time Horizons

    and Electoral Accountability

    George R. Crowley

    Term limits have been known to reduce electoral accountability by removing the possibility of reelection

    thus affecting economic policy choices (i.e.

    the ‘lame duck’ effect). We show that the magnitude and statistical significance of this effect is influenced by the expected length of a future career. By using incumbent age as a proxy for expected career length

    we find that the lame-duck effect is statistically observable only among those politicians with long careers ahead. Using data on US governors from 1950 to 2005

    we find evidence that the influence of term limits is heterogeneous

    primarily influencing young incumbents who hope to have long careers and thus have stronger incentives to remain accountable to voters. Indeed

    we find little evidence of a lame-duck effect among older incumbents

    suggesting that their already-shortened time horizons may offset the term limit effect.

    Term Limits

    Time Horizons

    and Electoral Accountability

    We use household data from the Current Population Survey to calculate how the real value of the so-called \"marriage tax\" or \"marriage subsidy\" in the federal individual income tax has changed over the period 1969 to 2009. We examine three issues: the magnitude of the marriage tax/subsidy and its evolution over time

    its effects on the distribution of income (including the effects of different demographic characteristics on the magnitudes and trends)

    and the causal factors in its evolution (e.g.

    tax changes

    demographic changes). We find that the tax treatment of the family has changed significantly over time

    from a large average marriage bonus in 1969

    to a large marriage tax in much of the 1990s and early 2000s

    to a large marriage subsidy since 2003. We also find that the marriage tax varies significantly and systematically by income level

    as well as by the number of children in the family

    the earnings ratios of the spouses

    the race of the family

    and the age of the household head. Finally

    we find that changes in income and family composition have influenced the magnitudes and trends of marriage taxes and subsidies

    but that adjustments in the federal income tax code account for most of the observed changes.

    Whither the Marriage Tax

    This article provides a more accurate estimate of implicit marginal tax rates (IMTRs) faced by low-income households in all fifty states. Complications arising from multiple program participation

    regional differences in wage regulations

    and cost of living make former generalizations about representative low-income households in a state potentially problematic. Additionally

    it is appropriate to account for differences in work requirements by choosing the relevant margin to estimate the IMTR

    and these margins vary by state. This article is the first to consider these margins

    and

    indeed

    the author finds significant variation of IMTRs for different states. One of biggest sources of variation is the structure of child care subsidies provisions and cost. However

    changes made to initial assumptions causes the estimated rates to vary in unpredictable ways. Given this complicated and unpredictable nature of the variation

    researchers should exercise caution when using estimated IMTRs to examine work incentives of welfare programs.

    Estimating Implicit Marginal Tax Rates of Welfare Recipients across the US States

    In this paper we estimate the impacts on income tax collections of legalizing same-sex marriage. We utilize new individual-level data sources to estimate the federal income tax consequences of legalizing same-sex marriages. These data sources also allow us to estimate the impact of legalization on state income tax collections. We find that 23 states would realize a net fiscal benefit from legalization

    while 21 states would experience a decline in revenue. The potential (annual) changes in state tax revenue range from negative $29 million in California to positive $16 million in New York. At the federal level

    our estimates suggest an overall reduction in revenues

    ranging from a potential loss of $187 million to $580 million. Overall

    we find that the federal and state impacts are quite modest. We also find that our estimates are only marginally affected by alternative assumptions about how many same-sex couples will choose to marry and which partner will claim any children for tax deduction purposes.

    Revisiting the Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriages

    Analysts of survey data suggest that blacks are more disapproving of homosexuality than whites. We empirically test this hypothesis by analyzing the influence of homosexuals on house prices in neighborhoods with varying concentrations of black residents. Indeed

    we find that an additional homosexual couple is associated with a decrease in house prices in predominantly black neighborhoods

    but an increase in house prices in predominantly white neighborhoods. This implies that a small part of the price differential between black neighborhoods and white neighborhoods may bevdue to prejudicial attitudes towards homosexuals.

    Are Black Neighborhoods Less Welcoming to Homosexuals than White Neighborhoods?

    This paper examines how merit-based tuition assistance policies implemented by a growing number of states affect one important dimension of college graduate behavior: the conditional probability of working in the state. Using a restricted-use administrative dataset for West Virginia

    we find that

    conditional on in-state enrollment and graduation

    graduates that received merit aid are less likely than similar non-recipient graduates to work at establishments in the state. These results suggest that the positive influences of merit aid in West Virginia on human capital accumulation stemming from increased in-state college enrollment and graduation are dampened by the locational decisions of the recipients after graduation

    Merit-Based College Tuition Assistance and the Conditional Probability of In-state Work

    Anti-discrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation have been adopted by many states to counteract perceived discrimination in the labor market. However

    we find the evidence of earnings disparities between homosexual and heterosexual men to be extremely sensitive to the choice of reference group. Relative to married heterosexual men

    gay men earn less

    and

    over time

    anti-discriminatory laws lessen this gap. Relative to unmarried

    coupled heterosexual men

    however

    gay men experience similar levels of earnings. The choice of reference group leads to opposite conclusions regarding the effectiveness and necessity of an anti-discriminatory law for homosexual men

    which highlights the need to construct reference groups with care. We also find that homosexual women experience similar earnings to their heterosexual female counterparts

    and the law has no effect on these relative wages.

    Revisiting Evidence of Labor Market Discrimination against Homosexuals and the Effects of Anti-Discriminatory Laws

    Leguizamon

    Tulane University

    WVU John Chambers College of Business and Economics

    West Virginia University

    Hochschule Fulda

    University of Applied Sciences

    Vanderbilt University

    Western Kentucky University

    Inter-American Development Bank

    Assistant Professor of Economics

    Bowling Green Area

    KY

    Western Kentucky University

    Provided research assistance

    data analysis

    and survey analysis for a project aiming to reveal the actual individual access to Microfinance in developing countries in Latin America.

    Intern

    Washington D.C. Metro Area

    Inter-American Development Bank

    Morgantown

    WV

    Assisted with local economic forecast. \n\nParticipated in the writing of state economic reports

    including some on the impact of Higher Education investments

    to be read by the legislature and other general audiences.

    Graduate Research Assistant- Bureau of Business and Economic Research (BBER)

    WVU John Chambers College of Business and Economics

    New Orleans

    LA

    Academic research regarding the political influence on state and local finances. Teach an undergraduate and Master's class on the Economics of Taxation.

    Teaching Fellow

    Tulane University

    Taught Business Ethics and Corporate Governance for the Master's in International Business program.

    Visiting Lecturer

    Fulda Area

    Germany

    Hochschule Fulda

    University of Applied Sciences

    Taught principles and intermediate courses in economics.

    West Virginia University

    Vanderbilt University

    Senior Lecturer

    Economics Department

    Greater Nashville Area

    TN

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