Resume

• 2010

  0%-time appointment

  Professor of Philosophy

  Urbana-Champaign

  Illinois Area

  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

• 2009

  Primary appointment

  Professor of Linguistics

  Urbana-Champaign

  Illinois Area

  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

• 2000

  Associate Professor of Linguistics

  Urbana-Champaign

  Illinois Area

  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

• 1996

  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

  Assistant Professor of Linguistics

  Urbana-Champaign

  Illinois Area

  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

• 1991

  University of Rochester

  Assistant Professor of Linguistics

  Rochester

  New York Area

  University of Rochester

• 1989

  UC Santa Cruz

  Santa Cruz

  California

  Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow

  UC Santa Cruz

• 1988

  University of Texas at Austin

  Lecturer in Linguistics

  Austin

  Texas Area

  University of Texas at Austin

• 1982

  Ph.D.

  Linguistics

• 1977

  B.A.

  German

  French

  Earlham College

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  Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics

  \n\nThis book explores linguistic and philosophical issues presented by sentences expressing personal taste

  such as Roller coasters are fun

  or Licorice is tasty. Standard semantic theories explain the meanings of sentences by specifying the conditions under which they are true; here

  Peter Lasersohn asks how we can account for sentences that are concerned with matters of opinion rather than matters of fact. He argues that a truth-theoretic semantic theory is appropriate even for sentences like these

  but that for such sentences

  truth and falsity must be assigned relative to perspectives

  rather than absolutely. The book provides a detailed and explicit formal grammar

  working out the implications of this conception of truth both for simple sentences and for reports of mental attitude. The semantic analysis is paired with a pragmatic theory explaining what it means to assert a sentence which is true or false only relativistically

  and with a speculative account of the functional motivation for a relativized notion of truth.\n

  Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics

  Peter

  Lasersohn