Resume

• 2004

  English

  Spanish

  Ph.D

  B.A/Finance

  The University of Texas-Pan American

• Quantitative Research

  Finance

  Research

  Higher Education

  Research Design

  Lecturing

  Stata

  Data Analysis

  R

  Analytical Skills

  Microsoft Excel

  Teaching

  Statistics

  Analysis

  SPSS

  Eviews

  Qualitative Research

  University Teaching

  Economics

  Econometrics

  Signaling

  Corporate Governance

  and the Equilibrium Dividend Policy

  The well-documented information content of dividends is contingent on the firm’s corporate governance. Using cross-listing events

  we find that firms reach a new equilibrium dividend policy after a shift in the level of shareholder protection and the direction of the dividend adjustment depends on the pre-cross-listing locus of control. Exchange-traded cross-listings can afford to decrease dividend payouts as they substitute dividends with better corporate governance. However

  dividend distributions and the likelihood to pay dividends increase when cross-listings are controlled by insiders

  supporting the signaling hypothesis. The cross-listing level and ownership structure convey useful information regarding future shifts in dividend payouts.

  Signaling

  Corporate Governance

  and the Equilibrium Dividend Policy

  Emilios Galariotis

  Overreaction Evidence from Large-Cap Stocks.

  Dave Jackson

  Insider-owned firms pursue U.S. cross-listings following periods of extraordinary performance. However

  the long-run post-cross-listing abnormal returns become negative only for insider-controlled cross-listings. We find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) has mitigated the market-timing attempts as negative abnormal returns are limited to the pre-SOX period

  supporting a cross-listing bonding benefit after U.S. securities regulation was enhanced. In addition

  investors anticipate future operating performance as stock returns incorporate forthcoming operating outcomes one and two years ahead. Whereas capital-raising cross-listings show better operating performance than non-capital-raising

  the returns of capital-raising firms are more sensitive to the potential agency problems created by insider-ownership.

  Cross-listing performance and insider ownership: The experience of U.S. investors

  Andre Mollick

  Financial Globalization and Stock Market Risk.

  Dave Jackson

  The linkage between the U.S. \"fear index\" and ADR premiums under non-frictionless stock markets.

  Purchasing Power Parity and Degree of Openness in Latin America: A Panel Analysis.

  The Overseas Listing Puzzle: Post-IPO Performance of Chinese Stocks and ADRs in the U.S. Market.

  The Overseas Listing Puzzle: Post-IPO Performance of Chinese Stocks and ADRs in the U.S. Market.

  National Cultural Effects on Leverage Decisions: Evidence from Emerging-Market ADRs

  Cointegration and Priority Relationships Between Energy Stocks and Oil Prices.

  Purpose\nUsing the small-business loan market

  this paper aims to test whether a structural shift in access to borrowers’ financial information (i.e. credit ratings) improves market efficiency

  thereby improving entrepreneurs’ access to external capital.\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThis research uses the National Survey of Small Business Finance in a conditional logistic regression framework to tease out the marginal propensity to grant lines of credit given the firm’s credit rating – treating both of the events

  namely

  line of credit and credit ratings

  as endogenous variables. This methodology overcomes potential reverse causality issues.\nFindings\nThe results show that information brokers have allowed small firms to break away from long-term monopolistic lending relationships

  thus contributing to more informationally efficient markets. Small businesses benefit from better-informed lenders by having better access to capital. Also

  women appear less likely to receive a line of credit even after adjusting for credit ratings.\nPractical implications\nThis research highlights the importance of credit report awareness/monitoring by entrepreneurs

  as the small-business credit rating grows rapidly. Relationship lending is not enough to reach optimal financing costs. These papers call for more regulated credit ratings industry to reduce potential moral hazards.\nOriginality/value\nThis paper tests whether bank lending relationships (soft information) still matter after accounting for credit ratings (hard information). Additionally

  this study measures the extent to which information sharing by data services bureaus

  a proxy for informational efficiency

  has increased allocation efficiency in the small-business loan market.

  Credit ratings

  relationship lending and loan market efficiency

  Profitability of Family-Controlled Firms: The Case of American Depository Receipts.

  Dave Jackson

  Bank Failures 2008: An Examination of the Impact on Stockholder Risk and Wealth.

  Andre V. Mollick

  We examine quarterly stock returns of 21 developed and 19 developing economies from 1999 to 2013. Over this period

  mean quarterly stock returns of 1.188% in developed economies contrast to 4.220% in developing economies. Economic growth has been substantially lower and interest rates have fallen (risen) in developed (developing) economies. Using dynamic panels

  we find statistically significant negative effects of interest rates on stock returns in the developed countries

  consistent with the expected cash flow hypothesis. In the developing markets

  however

  the world market portfolio is the sole determinant of stock returns. The contrasting effect of interest rates change on stock returns can be partially attributed to differing monetary policies and to the more mature capital markets inherent in developed economies.

  Stock returns and interest rates around the World: A panel data approach

  We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet

  investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings

  insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact

  insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year

  compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly

  we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.

  Controlling shareholders and market timing: Evidence from cross-listing events

  Dave Jackson

  Currency Depreciation Effects on American Depository Receipts: Evidence from Latin America.

  Income Inequality and Obesity Prevalence among OECD countries.

  The Effect of Government Contracts on Corporate Valuation.

  We document significantly lower valuations for government contractors in the United States. While contracting with government agencies reduces firms’ cost of equity

  it significantly lowers their sales growth. These findings are contingent on economic conditions; negative valuations dissipate as operating performance improves during economy- and industry-wide recessions. The overall negative valuation effect of government contracts holds only for government contractors in strategically unimportant industries

  as strategically important contractors have higher valuations

  driven by better operating performance regardless of economic conditions. This is the first study examining the relationship between government procurement and corporate valuation. It also adds to the growing body of literature on politically connected firms by analyzing government contractors as a related‑but‑separate channel of governmental influence on the corporate world.

  The Effect of Government Contracts on Corporate Valuation.

  Esqueda

  Tarleton State University

  Stephenville

  TX

  https://sites.google.com/site/omaraesqueda

  Assistant Professor of Finance

  Tarleton State University

  Stephenville

  TX

  Associate Professor of Finance at Tarleton State University

  Tarleton State University