Murray Fulton
- Courses10
- Reviews12
- School: University of Saskatchewan
- Campus:
- Department: Economics
- Email address: Join to see
- Phone: Join to see
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Location:
Saskatoon, SK - Dates at University of Saskatchewan: April 2002 - June 2011
- Office Hours: Join to see
Biography
University of Saskatchewan - Economics
Professor at University of Saskatchewan
Higher Education
Murray
Fulton
Saskatchewan, Canada
My interest is in organizations, in how people in organizations make decisions, and in the impact these decisions have on other people and organizations. My interdisciplinary research and teaching in these areas draws on concepts from game theory, industrial organization theory, behavioural economics, and political economy. I apply ideas from these areas to topics such as agricultural policy, co-operative governance, executive compensation in the public sector, and governance of the nation state.
Experience
Centre for the Study of Co-operatives
Director
I provide leadership and work toward the Centre's goal to provide people with conceptual and informational tools to understand co-operatives and to develop them as solutions to economic and social needs.
University of Saskatchewan
Professor
I conduct research and teach in a number of areas, including political economy, behavioural economics, policy analysis, and co-operative governance and theory.
Education
Texas A&M University
Master of Science (MSc)
Agricultural Economics
University of California, Berkeley
PhD
Agricultural Economics
Oxford University
Bachelor of Arts (BA)
Philosophy, Politics and Economics
Publications
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Overconfidence and Hubris: The Demise of Agricultural Co-operatives in Western Canada
Journal of Rural Cooperation
The last two decades have seen major changes to the agricultural landscape in Canada and with them major changes to the co-operative sector. The grain handling co-operatives in Western Canada have disappeared, as have their counterparts in the dairy and poultry sectors. Outside of Western Canada, and particularly in Québec, co-ops in the latter sectors have remained successful, while rural retail and farm input co-operatives continue to thrive in all parts of the country. The purpose of this paper is to trace the changes that have occurred in the rural co-operative sector in Canada over the last 10-15 years. Particular attention is paid to the large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada, since their decline has been particularly acute. It is argued that the overconfidence and hubris of co-op management were major contributing factors to the conversion of these co-ops to IOFs.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Overconfidence and Hubris: The Demise of Agricultural Co-operatives in Western Canada
Journal of Rural Cooperation
The last two decades have seen major changes to the agricultural landscape in Canada and with them major changes to the co-operative sector. The grain handling co-operatives in Western Canada have disappeared, as have their counterparts in the dairy and poultry sectors. Outside of Western Canada, and particularly in Québec, co-ops in the latter sectors have remained successful, while rural retail and farm input co-operatives continue to thrive in all parts of the country. The purpose of this paper is to trace the changes that have occurred in the rural co-operative sector in Canada over the last 10-15 years. Particular attention is paid to the large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada, since their decline has been particularly acute. It is argued that the overconfidence and hubris of co-op management were major contributing factors to the conversion of these co-ops to IOFs.
Governance and Managerial Effort in Consumer-Owned Enterprises
European Review of Agricultural Economics
This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises, illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Overconfidence and Hubris: The Demise of Agricultural Co-operatives in Western Canada
Journal of Rural Cooperation
The last two decades have seen major changes to the agricultural landscape in Canada and with them major changes to the co-operative sector. The grain handling co-operatives in Western Canada have disappeared, as have their counterparts in the dairy and poultry sectors. Outside of Western Canada, and particularly in Québec, co-ops in the latter sectors have remained successful, while rural retail and farm input co-operatives continue to thrive in all parts of the country. The purpose of this paper is to trace the changes that have occurred in the rural co-operative sector in Canada over the last 10-15 years. Particular attention is paid to the large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada, since their decline has been particularly acute. It is argued that the overconfidence and hubris of co-op management were major contributing factors to the conversion of these co-ops to IOFs.
Governance and Managerial Effort in Consumer-Owned Enterprises
European Review of Agricultural Economics
This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises, illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power.
Optimal Two-Part Pricing in a Carbon Offset Market: A Comparison of Organizational Types
Southern Journal of Economics
This article examines the optimal two-part pricing by an intermediary in a carbon offset market. In addition to creating a framework for analyzing carbon offset pricing, this article makes two contributions to the theoretical literature. First, we provide an in-depth examination of the roles played by the upstream inframarginal supply and participation elasticities and the downstream demand elasticity in determining the optimal two-part pricing strategy. Second, we compare the pricing decisions of three different organizational types: a for-profit firm, a public agency, and a producer association.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Overconfidence and Hubris: The Demise of Agricultural Co-operatives in Western Canada
Journal of Rural Cooperation
The last two decades have seen major changes to the agricultural landscape in Canada and with them major changes to the co-operative sector. The grain handling co-operatives in Western Canada have disappeared, as have their counterparts in the dairy and poultry sectors. Outside of Western Canada, and particularly in Québec, co-ops in the latter sectors have remained successful, while rural retail and farm input co-operatives continue to thrive in all parts of the country. The purpose of this paper is to trace the changes that have occurred in the rural co-operative sector in Canada over the last 10-15 years. Particular attention is paid to the large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada, since their decline has been particularly acute. It is argued that the overconfidence and hubris of co-op management were major contributing factors to the conversion of these co-ops to IOFs.
Governance and Managerial Effort in Consumer-Owned Enterprises
European Review of Agricultural Economics
This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises, illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power.
Optimal Two-Part Pricing in a Carbon Offset Market: A Comparison of Organizational Types
Southern Journal of Economics
This article examines the optimal two-part pricing by an intermediary in a carbon offset market. In addition to creating a framework for analyzing carbon offset pricing, this article makes two contributions to the theoretical literature. First, we provide an in-depth examination of the roles played by the upstream inframarginal supply and participation elasticities and the downstream demand elasticity in determining the optimal two-part pricing strategy. Second, we compare the pricing decisions of three different organizational types: a for-profit firm, a public agency, and a producer association.
The Political Economy of Food Price Volatility: The Case of Vietnam and Rice
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
This article argues that the structure of the Vietnamese rice export system is, in political economy terms, a rational response to the volatility present in the international rice market.
Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation.
Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered.
Understanding Public Sector Ethics: Beyond Agency Theory in Canada's Sponsorship Scandal
International Public Management Journal
Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged.
The future of agricultural cooperatives
Annual Review of Resource Economics
Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found.
Overconfidence and Hubris: The Demise of Agricultural Co-operatives in Western Canada
Journal of Rural Cooperation
The last two decades have seen major changes to the agricultural landscape in Canada and with them major changes to the co-operative sector. The grain handling co-operatives in Western Canada have disappeared, as have their counterparts in the dairy and poultry sectors. Outside of Western Canada, and particularly in Québec, co-ops in the latter sectors have remained successful, while rural retail and farm input co-operatives continue to thrive in all parts of the country. The purpose of this paper is to trace the changes that have occurred in the rural co-operative sector in Canada over the last 10-15 years. Particular attention is paid to the large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada, since their decline has been particularly acute. It is argued that the overconfidence and hubris of co-op management were major contributing factors to the conversion of these co-ops to IOFs.
Governance and Managerial Effort in Consumer-Owned Enterprises
European Review of Agricultural Economics
This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises, illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power.
Optimal Two-Part Pricing in a Carbon Offset Market: A Comparison of Organizational Types
Southern Journal of Economics
This article examines the optimal two-part pricing by an intermediary in a carbon offset market. In addition to creating a framework for analyzing carbon offset pricing, this article makes two contributions to the theoretical literature. First, we provide an in-depth examination of the roles played by the upstream inframarginal supply and participation elasticities and the downstream demand elasticity in determining the optimal two-part pricing strategy. Second, we compare the pricing decisions of three different organizational types: a for-profit firm, a public agency, and a producer association.
The Political Economy of Food Price Volatility: The Case of Vietnam and Rice
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
This article argues that the structure of the Vietnamese rice export system is, in political economy terms, a rational response to the volatility present in the international rice market.
Why Do Governments Use Pay for Performance? Contrasting Theories and Interview Evidence
Canadian Public Administration
In Canada, pay-for-performance (PFP) systems to compensate senior public servants have been established in several jurisdictions despite arguments by academics who doubt their efficacy in public sector environments characterized by high levels of intrinsic motivation. This article traces the pattern of PFP in Canada and distinguishes among “aggressive,” “passive,” and “reluctant” regimes. It explores why PFP is growing in popularity despite its acknowledged limitations.
