Resume

• 2004

  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

  Louisiana State University

  Texas A&M University at Qatar

  College Station

  TX

  Director of Undergraduate Programs

  Department of Political Science

  Texas A&M University

  College Station

  Texas

  Associate Head

  Department of Political Science

  Texas A&M University

  University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

  Assistant Professor

  Department of Political Science

  Texas A&M University

  Assistant Professor

  Department of Political Science

  Louisiana State University

  Texas A&M University

  College Station

  TX

  Director

  American Politics Program

  Department of Political Science

  Bryan/College Station

  Texas Area

  SEC Academic Leadership Development Fellow

  Texas A&M University

  Doha

  Qatar

  Associate Professor

  Texas A&M University at Qatar

  College Station

  TX

  Associate Professor

  Department of Political Science

  Texas A&M University

  College Station

  Texas

  Liberal Arts Faculty Administrative Fellow

  College of Liberal Arts

  Texas A&M University

• 2002

  PhD

  Political Science

• 2001

  MA

  Political Science

• 1998

  BA

  Political Science

  Lambda Chi Alpha

• Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions

  This article is a first attempt to develop and assess the competing predictions of the thermostatic model of public opinion and legitimation theory for the responses of public mood to Supreme Court decisions.

  Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions

  Higher Education

  American Politics

  Data Analysis

  Public Policy

  Stata

  Statistics

  Community Outreach

  Time Series Analysis

  University Teaching

  Program Evaluation

  Microsoft Office

  Political Communication

  Public Speaking

  Policy Analysis

  Political Science

  Qualitative Research

  Research

  Politics

  Teaching

  Grant Writing

  The Behavioral Political Economy of Budget Deficits: How Starve the Beast Policies Feed the Machine

  The Behavioral Political Economy of Budget Deficits: How Starve the Beast Policies Feed the Machine

  The notion of “starving the beast” has been an important justification for fiscal programs emphasizing revenue reductions since the mid-1970s. While the idea of restraining government spending by limiting government revenues has an intuitive appeal

  there is convincing evidence the reducing federal tax rates without coordinated reductions in federal spending actually produces long-term growth in spending. This perverse result is explained by a theory of “fiscal illusion.” By deferring the costs of government services and benefits through deficit financing

  starve the beast policies have the effect of lowering the perceived price of government in the minds of many citizens. We assess the principal behavioral prediction of the fiscal illusion theory.Incorporating estimates of the effects of federal deficits into a standard substantive model of Stimson's mood index

  we find strong support for a subjective price-driven theory of demand for government. In particular

  we find that the size of the federal budget deficit is significantly associated with greater demand for government services and benefits. This may have important implications for contemporary debates about fiscal discipline.

  The Behavioral Political Economy of Budget Deficits: How Starve the Beast Policies Feed the Machine

  Specialties: American political institutions

  judicial politics

  political behavior

  political communications

  time series analysis

  Joseph

  Ura

  Texas A&M University